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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether and how Serbian companies manage earnings 
to avoid losses and to avoid earnings decreases. The empirical evidence found in this study 
shows that there is a discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings around the zero 
earnings benchmark suggesting that Serbian companies engage in earnings management to 
avoid reporting losses.  Furthermore, this continuity disappears when we subtracted 
discretionary accruals from reported earnings indicating that Serbian companies use 
discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. However, the distribution of 
earnings does not provide evidence that Serbian companies manage earnings to avoid 
earnings decreases. These results are robust to alternative methods of scaling earnings and 
various ways of estimating discretionary accruals.  
 
Keywords: Earnings Management. Earnings Benchmark. Earnings Distribution. Discretionary 
Accruals.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been argued that market reword firms that report positive earnings sustain last 
year’s performance or meet analyst reward while it reacts negatively to firms that miss these 
three benchmarks. Consequently, achieving these benchmarks creates incentives for  executive 
managers to manipulate earnings (Bartov et al. 2002; Brown & Caylor 2005; Degeorge et al. 
1999; Habib & Hossain 2008; Kasznik & McNichols 2002; Lopez &and Rees 2002). Achieving 
these benchmarks is of particular interest to managers because entities involved with the firm  
such as investors, banks and  shareholders  consider them important as well (Burgstahler & 
Dichev 1997). Degeorge et al. (1999) assert that executives manipulate reported earnings to 
influence the perceptions of outsiders such as investors, banks, and suppliers about the firm’s 
underlying financial performance, and to gain personal satisfaction from making a target. 
Likewise, stakeholders utilize these benchmarks as reference points to assess and reward 
managers.   
 Benchmark-driven earnings management happen when managers opportunistically use 
the judgment and estimates allowed by accounting standards (e.g., depreciation, allowances for 
doubtful debt and inventory allowances and consumption) or structure transaction (e.g., 
changing production volume to influence costs of goods sold or timing the sales of fixed asset 
and investment) so as to alter financial reports either to mislead users of accounting information 
about the firm’s underlying financial performance or to gain some private benefits (Healy & 
Wahlen 1999; Stlowy & Breton 2004). Regardless the method that firms use or the incentives 
behind the opportunistic earnings management behavior, it has negative consequences on the 
firms future performance (Degeorge et al. 1999), usefulness of financial reports, shareholders, 
employees, the communities in which firms work and society at large  (Prior 2007; Rasheed et 
al. 2005). However, it is of  paramount importance to find the exact line of distinction between 
earnings management practices and financial reporting fraud, although  nothing written  
provides any one acceptable framework to differentiate between the two (Marai & Pavlović 
2013). In recent years, threshold-oriented earnings management has received significant 
attention in accounting literature. However, most of these studies focus more on developed 
economies with strong legal institutions and well-developed financial markets. In addition, the 
findings of studies that investigated prevalence of threshold-oriented earnings management in 
an international context indicate differences in earnings management practice on a country 
level. These differences exist because of the fact that manager’s ability of manipulating reported 
earnings is influenced by institutional factors such as investor protection, legal enforcement and 
culture. For example, Leuz et al. (2003) study of earnings management across 30 countries 
found that earnings management is relatively low in countries with high outside investor 
protection, and widespread in high  uncertainty-avoidance countries. These results are 
confirmed by Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) who also use a sample of 30 countries and 
conclude that since discretion and smoothing are influenced by different factors, researchers 
should be cautious when   combining  these diverse reporting behaviors into an overall earnings 
management measure (Glaum et al. 2004; Shen & Chih 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Doupnik 
2008;  Han et al. 2010).  
In the context of Serbia, researchers have not shown strong interest in obtaining the 
empirical results to support the application of earnings management in business practice of 
Serbian companies. The accounting profession confirmed that application of creative 
accounting is present in business of economic entities in the Republic of Serbia to a significant 
degree (Knežević et al. 2012).  Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate whether and 
how Serbian companies manage earnings to avoid losses and to avoid decreases in earning to 
sustain last year's performance. To achieve this goal first, study builds on the earlier work by 
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) to investigate whether Serbian 
companies manage earnings to avoid reporting losses and decreases in earnings. Second, similar 
to Gore et al. (2007), to investigate how these firms manage earnings, study estimates 
discretionary accruals to capture the magnitude of earnings management. Then study calculates 
pre-managed earnings by excluding the discretionary accruals from reported earnings. The 
empirical evidence found in this study shows that there is a discontinuity in the distribution of 
reported earnings around zero earnings benchmark suggesting that Serbian companies engage in 
earnings management to avoid reporting losses. Furthermore, this continuity disappears when 
discretionary accruals were subtracted from reporting earnings indicating that Serbian 
companies use discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. However, the 
distribution of earnings does not provide evidence that Serbian companies manage earnings to 
avoid earnings decreases.   
The importance of the results of this study is twofold. Firstly, it is the  first study to 
investigate earnings management in  the Serbian context which differs  from  that in previous  
literature, for  example,  in  terms  of firm size and  institutional  setting. Therefore, It aspires to 
contribute to our understanding and knowledge on the issue related to earnings management. 
Secondly, it is expected that the study’s findings will assist stock market participants to evaluate 
the quality of firms’ reports. In addition, they are expected to assist regulators to improve 
disclosure requirements. The rest of this study is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a 
literature review of relevant studies. Section 3 represents the study hypothesis. Section 4 
outlines the methodology and research design issues, while section 5 describes the sampling and 
data collection. Section 6 reports the results and discusses them, while further analysis and 
robustness tests are presented in section 7. In  the  final  section,  the  main  conclusion  of  the  
study is provided. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Investigating whether, how and why firms manage earnings to just meet or exceed 
certain benchmarks has been of great concern for researches especially in developed countries. 
However, owing to the fact that earnings management practices cannot be observed directly, as 
well as the numerous methods management adopt in its application, identification is 
problematic (Marai & Pavlović  2014). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide the first cross-
sectional distribution approach to investigate threshold-oriented earnings management using a 
sample of US companies. This approach is based on two main steps; the first one is identifying 
certain thresholds that would motivate managers to manage earnings. These are to avoid 
reporting loss and earnings decreases. The second step is testing the assumption that existence 
of earnings management to achieve these targets will cause discontinuity in cross-sectional 
distributions of earnings and earnings. That is this distribution will take a shape of remarkably 
low frequencies of small negative reported earnings and unusually high frequencies of small 
positive reported earnings. Likewise, earnings management to report earnings decrease will take 
the shape of unusually low frequencies of small earnings decrease and unusually high 
frequencies of small earnings increase. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that discretionary 
accruals components of earnings and cash flow are managed to increase reported earnings.  
Similarly, using a sample of US companies Degeorge et al. (1999) and Dechow et al. 
(2000) observe discontinuities in earnings distribution that indicate earnings management 
motivated by threshold; report positive profits, sustain recent performance and meet analysis’ 
expectations. Dechow et al. (2000) assert that these firms want to avoid disappointing analysts 
since they are most likely to suffer from the "torpedo effect": small earnings disappointments 
lead to large stock price declines. In an Australian context, Holland and Ramsay (2003) 
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examine the distribution of reported earnings around two benchmarks (zero earnings and 
sustaining last year’s performance). Generally, they find significant discontinuities in the 
distribution of reported earnings and changes in earnings in the form of significantly more small 
earnings increases and small profits than expected and considerably fewer small earnings 
decreases and small losses than expected. Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Glaum et 
al. (2004) provide evidence on earnings management in order to avoid losses, decreases in 
earnings, and earnings below the forecasts of analysts in the U.S. and Germany. However, the 
results indicate that there are not statistically significant differences between the extent of 
earnings management to avoid losses and earnings decreases in the U.S. and in Germany. By 
contrast, earnings management in order to avoid negative earnings surprises appears to be more 
prevalent in the U.S. than in Germany.  Some recent studies apply Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) methodology in emerging stock market and such as Amar and Abaoub (2010) find that 
Tunisian companies manage earnings to avoid losses and earnings decreases rather than to 
avoid negative earnings surprises. El‐Sayed Ebaid (2012) documents that there is a 
discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings and earnings changes around zero 
benchmark suggesting that Egyptian listed firms tend to engage in earnings management to 
avoid reporting losses and avoid reporting earnings decreases. 
Regarding how earnings management is conducted, academic research has examined the 
mechanisms that managers use to achieve earnings benchmarks. Generally, firms are found to 
use both accrual earnings management and real earnings management to beat or meet earnings 
targets. Matsumoto (2002) finds evidence that firms use abnormal accruals as mechanism to 
manage earnings upward or to guide earnings forecast downward to meet or exceed analysis’ 
forecast. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) provide distributional evidence that managers 
consistently use both discretionary accruals and operating cash flow to increase reported earning 
to meet or slightly beat analysts’ forecasts if pre-managed earnings are below market 
expectations. Ayers et al. (2006) find that the discretionary accruals are positively related to 
achieving the profit and earnings change benchmarks throughout the earnings distribution. Gore 
et al. (2007) indicate that the earnings levels, changes and surprises of UK firms, like those of 
US firms, distributed discontinuously around zero. However, non-discretionary earnings levels, 
changes and surprises for the same sample are distributed without this discontinuity at zero, 
suggesting that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution is attributable to discretionary 
accrual. Caylor (2010) find that firms use both deferred revenue and accounts receivable to 
manage earnings in an attempt to avoid negative earnings surprises but little evidence that either 
are managed to avoid losses or earnings decreases.  Jackson and Liu (2010) find that firms 
manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income-increasing bad debt expense) to 
meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. Regarding real earnings management, Roychowdhury 
(2003) finds evidence suggesting that firms engaging in real activities manipulation, such as 
reducing  discretionary expenses, giving price discounts to boost sales temporarily, or by 
overproduction to meet analysts’ forecasts. Gunny (2010) indicates that firms practicing real 
activity manipulating such as (reducing research and development to increase income, reducing 
selling, general, and administrative expenses to increase income, cutting prices to boost sales in 
the current period, and ⁄ or overproducing to decrease cost of goods sold) is positively 
associated with firms just meeting earnings benchmarks. Chapman and Steenburgh (2011) 
confirm managers’ stated willingness to sacrifice long-term value in order to smooth earnings 
and their stated preference to use real actions to boost earnings to meet different types of 
earnings benchmarks.  
However, some previous studies question the assumption that earnings management 
behavior can be completely explained by the discontinuity of the earnings distribution. For 
instance, Dechow et al. (2003) do not find an association between discretionary operating 
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accruals and the earnings discontinuity. Durtschi and Easton (2005) find that the shapes of the 
frequency distributions of reported earnings reflect deflation, sample selection, and a difference 
between the characteristics of profit and loss observations (such as market pricing and analyst 
optimism/pessimism). Therefore, these factors must be considered before using the shapes of 
these distributions (around zero) as evidence of earnings management. The same results 
confirmed by Beaver et al. (2007) and Durtschi and Easton (2009) who indicate that researchers 
should take evidence beyond the mere shapes of distribution and use caution in interpreting a 
discontinuity in the distribution of net income as evidence of earnings management.  
Taken together, findings of previous literature seem to imply that earnings tend to be 
managed toward certain benchmarks such as reporting positive earnings, avoiding loss and 
meeting analysts’ expectations. Such behavior is likely to be reflected in a discontinuity in 
cross-sectional distributions of earnings and earnings changes. That is, the distribution takes a 
form of unusually low frequencies of negative small earnings and unusually high frequencies of 
positive small earnings. Similarly, management to earnings decrease will be reflected in the 
form of unusual low frequencies of small earnings decrease and unusually high frequencies of 
small earnings increase. However, this discontinuity is not necessarily to be taken as evidence 
of earnings management unless linked to the mechanisms that are available for managers to use 
for altering reported earnings. 
 
3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
In this paper, it was firstly examined whether earnings and earnings changes are 
distributed with a discontinuity at zero earnings and earnings changes, similar to Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997). On the other hand, study also takes the view of previous literature (such as: 
Dechow et al. 2003; Degeorge et al. 1999; Durtschi & Easton 2005) that such discontinuities 
would be consistent with, but not necessarily proof of, earnings management to achieve targets. 
Therefore, study tests the link between discontinuity in the distribution of earnings and earnings 
change and discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management.  
To test whether Serbian companies engage in earnings management to report positive 
profits following hypothesis is stated: 
 
H1- There is significantly more reported small positive earnings and significantly fewer 
reported small losses than would be expected.  
To test whether Serbian companies engaged in earnings management to sustain last year's 
performance, the following hypothesis is stated:  
 
H2- There is significantly more frequency of small earnings increases and significantly less 
frequency of small earnings decreases than would be expected.   
In order to investigate how Serbian companies manage reported earnings, the link between 
discretionary accruals and threshold earnings management is tested. The following hypotheses 
are stated: 
 
H3- The frequencies of negative small pre-managed earnings (i.e. Reported earnings minus 
abnormal discretionary accruals) and positive small pre-managed earnings are equal to the 
frequencies that are expected under a smooth distribution.  
 
H4- The frequencies of negative small pre-managed earnings changes (i.e. Earnings change 
minus abnormal discretionary accruals) and positive small pre-managed earnings changes are 
equal to the frequencies that are expected under a smooth distribution.  
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Thresholds of earnings management  
 
Previous studies have documented that managers tendency to avoid losses, avoid 
earnings decreases and  meet analysts’ earnings forecasts are the most important threshold that 
drive manipulating reported earnings (Burgstahler & Dichev  1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Graham et al. 2005). However, some other studies (Brown & Caylor 2005; Dechow et al. 2003) 
have documented a change in the earnings threshold hierarchy. They report that avoiding 
negative earnings surprises has become more important than avoiding losses and earnings 
decreases in recent years.  
In this paper, first two earnings thresholds are focused because the analysts’ 
expectations are not available in the Serbian stock market. The first benchmark defines 
managers who want to avoid reporting losses and focuses on firms around the zero earnings 
level. The second benchmark defines managers who want to increase earnings as compared to a 
prior period and focuses on firms with positive or negative small earnings changes. Earnings (E) 
are measured as the annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by opening total assets as 
EARNt/A t–1. Earnings changes are measured as following: 
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4.2 Abnormal accruals  
 
In this study  abnormal accruals were estimated, a proxy for accruals management, using 
modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995). The reason behind using this model 
is  that it recognized  in  literature as the most powerful model for detecting earnings 
management (Young 1999).  
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     = total accruals in year t for firm i, it is estimated as earnings before extraordinary items 
less the net cash flows from operating activities.  
      = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i.  
       = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i.  
     = Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i;  
    = error term in year t for firm i; 
      = Total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
 
 
 
Total Accruals    =      Non-Discretionary Accruals            + Discretionary Accruals  
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4.3 Pre-managed earnings  
 
This study identifies pre-managed earnings as reported earnings minus abnormal 
accruals (discretionary accruals). Then, it is calculated by subtracting these abnormal 
discretionary accruals which are estimated using modified Jones model developed by Dechow 
et al. (1995) from reporting earnings.  
 
4.4 Distribution of reported earnings and earnings changes  
 
Similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) histograms of the 
earnings and earnings changes distribution were represented to visualize the discontinuity of 
earnings and earnings change around zero. Earnings are defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items deflated by beginning of the year total assets. Regarding the changes of 
earnings are defined as difference the between earnings before extraordinary items year t and 
year t-1 deflated by beginning of the year total assets.  
In constructing histograms, choosing the interval width is an essential point. Many 
methods have been recommended by Silverman (1986) and Scott (1992) cited by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) to determine the interval width of a histogram. Given sample sizes, this 
study measures the interval width as 2 (IQR) n-1/3. This yields an interval width of 0.03 for 
reported earnings and 0.015 for earnings change distributions.  
 
4.5 Statistical test  
 
A statistical test constructed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) is utilized to test the 
significance of the study hypothesis. This test assumes that under the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management, the cross-sectional distribution of earnings levels and changes in 
earnings are relatively smooth. In accordance with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), this study 
defines the smoothness of the distribution to be  that the number of actual observations in any 
given interval is not significantly different from the average of the observations of the two  
immediately adjacent intervals divided by the estimated standard deviation of the difference. It 
is expressed in the following formula: 
 
DS i (standardized difference) = (AN i -ENi)/SD  
Where:  
AN i: the actual number of observations in interval i, 
EN i: the expected number of observations in interval i. Specifically, It is calculated as the 
average of the number of observations in the intervals immediately before and after the interval 
i.  EA i = (AN i-1 + ANi+1)/2. 
 SD: standard deviation of the difference between the actual and expected frequency of the 
observations nearby interval i. It is the estimated as following, 
  
 
SDi = [Np i (1 - p i) + (1/4)N(p i_1 + p i+1 )(1 - p i_1 –p i+1 )] 1/2, 
Where, 
N: is the total number of observations in the sample;  
P i: is the probability that an observation is likely to fall into the interval i.   
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4.6 Sampling  
 
The population of the study is composed of the Serbian listed companies on stock 
exchanges during 2009 and 2014. Consistent with the previous studies (Burgstahler & Dichev  
1997; Peasnell et al. 2000) the sample is restricted to non-financial firms. The financial 
institutions are excluded because their specific accounting requirements differ substantially 
from those of industrial and commercial companies. As a result, the final sample consists of 
30 firms from different industries representing observations over the period of 2009 to 2014. 
 
5 RESULTS 
 
5.1 Whether and how Serbian companies manage reported earnings to avoid reporting 
losses 
 
From previously mentioned literature, earnings management designed to report positive 
profits is likely to be reflected in the across-sectional distribution of earnings in the form of 
unusually low frequencies of small losses and unusually high frequencies of small positive 
earnings. 
The study examines the distribution of scaled earnings of the Serbian listed firms to test 
the hypothesis H1 that there are significantly more reported small positive earnings and 
significantly fewer reported small losses than would be expected. 
Figure 1 is a histogram of the scaled earnings with interval width of 0.03 ranging from -
0.15 to 0.15. Visual inspection indicates that there is a discontinuity in the distribution of scaled 
reported earnings around zero earnings benchmark. More explanation can be obtained  from 
Table 1 , the frequency of firms in the interval (-0.03,0) is 0.07, (i.e. Group of  firms that  report 
earnings  slightly less than zero),  while the expected  frequency of these firms  is 0.19, which is  
the average of two immediately adjacent intervals (-0.06,-0.03 and 0,0.03). This difference of 
0.068 between the actual and expected frequency suggests that some firms in the interval (-0.03, 
0) may have incentives to increase their earnings to meet or exceed the zero-benchmarks to 
avoid reporting losses. Whereas, the frequency of firms in the interval (0, 0.03) is 0.36 (i.e. 
Groups of firms that report earnings slightly greater than zero) and the expected frequency of 
this group is 0.071, which is the average of two immediately adjacent intervals (-0.03, 0 and 
0.03, 0.06). This asymmetry between actual and expected reported earnings around zero reflects 
that Serbian listed firms have a tendency to manage earnings to avoid reporting losses. This  
result confirmed by the statistical test developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) to test the 
significance of the difference around zero-earnings benchmarks. Table 1 shows that the 
standardized difference in the interval immediately to the left of zero (-0.03, 0) is -4.35 and the 
standardized difference in the interval immediately to the right of zero (0, 0.03) is 6.98. 
Accordingly, under the assumption that the standardization differences are approximately 
normal, the test statistics are significant at a level less than 0.01 suggesting that firms manage 
reported earnings to avoid losses. Thus, the hypothesis H1 is supported indicating that Serbian 
listed firms tend to manage earnings to avoid reporting losses. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
(Figure 1 about here) 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
Furthermore, it was expected in H3 that the frequencies of negative small pre-managed 
earnings (i.e. Reported earnings minus abnormal discretionary accruals) and positive small 
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pre-managed earnings are equal to the frequencies expected under a smooth distribution.  As 
expected, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of pre-managed earnings is relatively smooth 
around zero, suggesting that the discontinuity of the distribution of reported earnings around 
zero is a result of discretionary accruals from current period earnings.  From Table 1 it can be 
seen that there is more detection of 0.18 of firms in the interval to the left of zero (-0.03,0) 
than the expected 0.125. This difference between actual and expected frequencies is 
insignificant according to z-test statistic of 1.57. Similarly, z-test indicate the insignificant 
difference between the actual and expected frequencies of the observations in the interval (0, 
0.03) (i.e. Group of firms report earnings slightly more than zero).  These  results confirm H1 
and H3 hypotheses that reported earnings is distributed  irregularly around zero, while pre-
managed reported earnings distributed smoothly.  
 
5.2 Whether and how Serbian companies manage reported earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases 
 
From  aforementioned literature, earnings  management  to  avoid  earnings  decreases  
is  likely  to  be  reflected  in the cross-sectional distributions of scaled earnings changes in a 
form of unusually low frequencies  of  small  earnings  decreases  and  unusually  high  
frequencies  of  small earnings increases. The study  examines  the  distribution  of  earnings  
changes  of  Serbian   listed  firms in order to  test the hypothesis H2 that there is significantly 
more frequency of small earnings increases and significantly fewer frequency of small earnings 
decreases than would be expected.  
Figure 3 is a histogram of the scaled earnings changes with interval widths of 0.015 in 
the range from -0.075 to 0.075. Figure 3 shows a small discontinuity in the distribution of 
reported earnings changes near zero change benchmark. In more detail, Table 2 shows that the 
frequency of earnings changes in the interval (0, 0.015) is a 0.20 (i.e. Group of firms that report 
earnings increase slightly more than zero), while the expected frequency is 0.15. This difference 
of 0.05 is statically insignificant with z-test of 1.348. Regarding the frequency of earning 
changes in the interval (-0.015, 0), the actual frequency is 0.23 and it is more than the expected 
frequency which is 0.15. Accordingly, in general, these results do not support the hypothesis H2 
that Serbian companies manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases.  Furthermore, these 
findings are confirmed when the distribution of pre-managed earnings change was investigated. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the distribution of pre-managed earning changes appears to be 
relatively smooth around zero benchmark change. This smoothness is supported by z-test in 
Table 2. The standardized difference for the interval (-0.015,0) immediately left of zero is 0.37, 
and the standardized difference for the interval (0,0.015) immediately right of zero is 0.12. Both 
values are not significant. This evidence is not supportive of the clam that Serbian listed 
companies use discretionary accruals to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. Thus, 
hypothesis H4 that frequency of negative small pre-managed earnings and positive small pre-
managed earnings changes are equal to the frequencies that are expected under a smooth 
distribution is accepted. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
(Figure 4 about here) 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
6 FURTHER ANALYSIS  
 
Further tests have been undertaken in order to assess the robustness of the study’s results 
to scaling factor and errors related to the measurement of discretionary accruals. The study 
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reexamines distributions of reported earnings and earnings changes using total sales as scaling 
factor instead of total assets at the beginning-of-the-year. Furthermore, the study recalculates 
pre–managed reported earnings as reported earnings minus discretionary accruals using 
performance matched model by Kothari et al. (2005) instead of modified Jones model. 
Figure 5 and 6 are histograms of distributions of reported earnings and pre-managed 
earnings scaled by total sales. The histogram interval widths are of 0.03 for scaled earnings 
ranging from -0.15 to .015. Figure 7 and 8 are histograms of distributions of earnings changes 
and pre-managed earnings changed scaled by total sales with interval widths of 0.015 ranging 
from -0.075 to 0.075.   
As shown in Figure 5, there is discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings 
around zero earnings. This discontinuity reveals that the frequency of reported positive small 
earnings occur significantly more than would be expected. Whereas, the frequency of small 
reported losses occur significantly less than would be expected. However, Figure 6 indicates 
that pre-managed earnings is distributed almost smoothly around zero earnings benchmark.  
Regarding the distribution of earnings changes the results also remain unchanged.  Figure 7 and 
8 indicate that there is no irregularity in distribution around zero earnings changes as well as 
pre-managed earnings change. Taken as a whole, the results obtained from further analysis 
confirm that previous results are not a result of a scaling factor or measurement error by using 
discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings management. 
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
(Figure 6 about here) 
(Figure 7 about here) 
(Figure 8 about here) 
 
7 CONCLUSION   
 
This study investigates whether and how Serbian companies manage earnings to avoid 
losses and to avoid earnings decreases to sustain the previous year's performance. To answer 
these questions first, we build on the earlier work by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
Degeorge et al. (1999) to investigate whether Serbian companies manage earnings to avoid 
reporting losses and earnings decreases. We expect that if Serbian companies manage earnings 
to achieve these targets, then there will be significantly more reported small profits and 
significantly fewer reported small losses than expected. Secondly, and similar to Gore et al. 
(2007), to investigate how these firms manage earnings  discretionary accruals to capture the 
magnitude of earnings management were estimated. Then pre-managed earnings were 
calculated by excluding the discretionary accruals from reported earnings. It was expected that 
if firms engage in earnings management, pre-managed reported earnings and pre-managed 
reported earnings change would be distributed smoothly. 
The empirical evidence found in this study shows that there is a discontinuity in the 
distribution of reported earnings around zero earnings benchmark suggesting that Serbian 
companies engage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses. Furthermore, this 
continuity disappears when discretionary accruals were subtracted from reported earnings 
indicating that Serbian companies use discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. 
However, the distribution of earnings change does not provide evidence that Serbian companies 
manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. These results are robust to alternative methods of 
scaling earnings and various ways of estimating discretionary accruals.  
The importance of the results of this study is twofold. Firstly, it is the first study to investigate 
earnings management in the Serbian context and which differs from that in previous  literature; 
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for  example,  in  terms  of firm size and  institutional  setting. Therefore, it aspires to contribute 
to understanding and knowledge on the issue related to earnings management. Secondly, it is 
expected that the study’s findings will assist stock market participants to evaluate the quality of 
firms’ reports. Furthermore, it is expected to assist regulators to improve disclosure 
requirements. 
However, the results of this study are subject to some limitations.  First, the small 
sample size may lead to bias in the results, so that the generalization of these findings should be 
interpreted with caution. Second, distribution and total accruals approaches which have been 
used in this study, can only tell us about the level of earnings management without mention of 
the specific techniques that have been used. Therefore, further research is needed to investigate 
specific accruals that firms may use to alter reported earnings to achieve benchmark targets. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 1 : Frequency distribution of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings  
Earrings Pre- managed earnings 
Intervals  Obs, Freq.% Obs-Exp. Z Obs, Freq.% Obs-Exp. Z 
-0.15--0.12 0.01 -0.007 -1.282 0.007 -0.017 -1.533 
-0.12--0.09 0.03 -0.027 -0.204 0.027 -0.003 -0.204 
-0.09--0.06 0.05 -0.054 1.481 0.054 0.010 0.462 
-0.06--0.03 0.02 -0.020 -2.286 0.061 -0.057 -2.185 
-0.03-0 0.07 -0.068 -4.350*** 0.182 0.057 1.578 
0-0.03 0.36 -0.365 6.983*** 0.189 0.041 1.088 
0.03-0.06 0.07 -0.074 -5.448 0.115 0.000 0.000 
0.06-0.09 0.11 -0.108 0.562 0.041 -0.071 -3.010 
0.09-0.12 0.11 -0.108 1.029 0.108 0.054 1.894 
0.12-0.15 0.05 -0.047 -0.905 0.068 0.003 0.136 
 
 
Table 2 : Frequency of reported earnings change and pre-managed earnings change 
Earnings change   Pre-managed earnings change  
Intervals  Obs, Freq.% Obs-Exp. Z Obs, Freq.% Obs-Exp. Z 
-0.075--0.06 0.027 -0.024 -1.299 0.047 -0.095 -3.72 
-0.06--0.045 0.014 -0.030 -2.025 0.068 0.020 0.85 
-0.045--0.03 0.061 0.007 0.288 0.047 -0.020 -0.90 
-0.03--0.015 0.095 -0.051 -1.665 0.068 0.000 0.00 
-0.015-0 0.230 0.084 2.150* 0.088 0.010 0.37 
0-0.015 0.196 0.051 1.348 0.088 0.003 0.12 
0.015-0.03 0.061 -0.071 -2.656 0.081 0.014 0.51 
0.03-0.045 0.068 0.017 0.702 0.047 -0.010 -0.46 
0.045-0.06 0.041 -0.017 -0.810 0.034 0.000 0.00 
0.06-0.075 0.047 -0.010 -0.464 0.020 -0.095 -4.55 
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